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Hackers have learned to leverage the enormous number
of poorly protected home computers by turning them into
a large distributed system (known as a botnet), making
home computers an important frontier for security re-
search. They present special problems: owners are un-
sophisticated, and usage profiles are varied making one-
size-fits-all firewall policies ineffective. We propose a
social firewall that collects security decisions and both
user and usage characteristics, and provides users with
personalized information to assist with allow/deny rec-
ommendations. To succeed, a social firewall must deal
with at least three user behavior issues: why contribute
private information? why make effort to provide quality
information? and, how to prevent manipulation by adver-
saries? We sketch an incentive-centered design approach
to each problem. We provide an economic model and
some analytic results for a solution to the fundamental
problem: why contribute? We show that an excludable
public goods mechanism can achieve a better outcome
than a system without social motivators.
1 Home Computer Security
For many years, hackers targeted computers approxi-
mately in proportion to the information accessible on
or from them. Consequently, security research focused
on attacks against large enterprise systems, protected by
sophisticated human and technical resources. More re-
cently, hackers developed the botnet, hosted by large
numbers of insecure computers. These machines are tar-
geted because they rarely are protected by either sophis-
ticated human or technical resources.
To build a botnet, an attacker hacks (say, through a
virus or worm) into many computers and installs “con-
trol” software. The controlled client (zombie) listens for
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Sci-
ence Foundation under Grant No. CNS 0716196.
commands from a “master control” computer. A single
command from the hacker to the master can then be car-
ried out by all active zombies. Botnets enable crimes
such as spam, click fraud, and distributed denial of ser-
vice [17]. Observed botnets range in size from a couple
hundred zombies to 50,000 or more zombies [1].
Since any computer with an Internet connection can
be an effective zombie, hackers logically turned to at-
tacking the most vulnerable population: home comput-
ers. Home computer users are usually untrained and
have few technical security skills. While some software
has improved the average level of security of this class
of computers, home computers still represent the largest
population of vulnerable computers with decent Internet
connections. Existing security research has not made
substantial progress on solving the problems of attacks
against machines maintained by unsophisticated users.
Botnets are a serious problem. Nine of out ten email
messages are spam [16], and 80% of those messages are
being sent through botnets [15]. Botnets also are used to
steal personal information, and to conduct multiple out-
bound crimes such as such as click fraud and trust fraud
[15], and extortion of “protection” payments under threat
of denial of service attacks [10]. As of 28 March 2007,
the Shadow Server website1 was tracking over 1.5 mil-
lion active zombies attached to over 1300 distinct bot-
nets.
2 A Social Firewall
A recent HoneyNet study of botnet activity reports that
botnets are much more active during the day than at night
[21]. Over 50% of the methods that the botnets used to
spread themselves were exploits of three well-known se-
curity holes: ASN1, DCOM, and LSASS.2 Patches have
1http://www.shadowserver.com
2See Microsoft security bulletins MS04-007, MS03-026, MS-04-
011 respectively.
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existed for these vulnerabilities for months, yet many
computers remain vulnerable. From these facts we in-
fer botnets are succeeding largely by infecting unpatched
and home computers.
Most home users, lacking the expertise and inclination
for security, attempt to delegate their security concerns.
They choose to delegate decisions to a technology (e.g.,
a firewall), a person (e.g., a knowledgable colleague), a
local support group, or an institution (e.g., a bank) [5].
We focus in this paper on firewalling, fully aware that
this alone is unlikely be a complete solution.
Firewalls are intrusion detection and prevention sys-
tems (IDPS) [14]. Their design goal is to prevent unau-
thorized users from taking unwanted actions on a com-
puter. They monitor computer activities and can stop
certain technical actions in order to implement a policy
stating which activities are acceptable and which are not.
For example, a firewall might monitor network packets
and can block those directed to particular TCP ports.
Firewalls have several technical design challenges:
accurately identifying behaviors, offering a policy lan-
guage flexible enough to map owner preferences over
behaviors into actions, and preventing compromise of
the firewall itself, among others. One especially diffi-
cult challenge for unsophisticated users is to configure
the firewall policy appropriately. Yet security experts
know what types of machines are being compromised,
and how: why are we not stopping the problem?
We believe an important part of the problem is that,
particularly for home computers, we try to use one-size-
fits-all solutions. The software has the difficult job of de-
tecting malware while letting through all legitimate uses
of the computer; but this distinction varies across users.
For example, most home computers do not need to be lis-
tening for external DCOM connections. However, some
do, so it is important that standardized anti-virus tools
not flag this activity as a problem. In trying to find a
lowest-common-denominator security policy, standard-
ized policies are too weak to stop malicious activity.
A common approach to the customization problem is
interactive policy generation (see, e.g., ZoneAlarm). For
example, a firewall policy may specify one of three ac-
tions for any given event (including a default for not oth-
erwise specified events): allow, deny, or ask the user for
a decision in real time. Interactivity offers flexibility and
convenience for users who may want to postpone deci-
sions until a event is encountered. However, it does not
solve the underlying problem: the unsophisticated user
may not know the risks or the benefits of permitting cer-
tain requests, and may face high costs of acquiring that
knowledge, thus preventing effective policy decisions in
the face of potential security risks.
We draw these threads together to propose a new
type of home computer IDPS: a social firewall. For
our purposes, a social firewall can be conceived as an
application-layer service running on top of a standard
kernel-level firewall. The idea is simple: provide an
automated, interactive way for a user to apply the pro-
cessed, collective knowledge of a community of trusted
users to interactive policy decisions. For example, when
presented with an interactive allow/deny query, the social
firewall might also offer information about other users
who were presented with similar policy decisions:a sta-
tistical summary of the allow/deny decisions made by
others, and/or contributed information characterizing the
reasons for those decisions. This information can help
the user determine which decision best fits her needs, al-
lowing her to customize her policy appropriately.
Getting participants to contribute information to the
server is only one step towards an effective social fire-
wall. If the only information needed were the allow/deny
decision, then the firewall software could be configured
to send that bit, and we would be done (with this set
of behavioral issues). However, as we explained above,
one-size-fits-all policies are not effective, and thus the
social firewall users need additional information to as-
sist in personalization of policy.3 For example, users
could contribute their own reasoning for making the al-
low/deny decision, which other users can evaluate to see
if it applies to them. Additionally, users could contribu-
tion something about her security sophistication, risk tol-
erance, or typical computing activities, all of which are
relevant to policy decisions. By enabling users to share
this type of information, a social firewall encourages bet-
ter and more personalized policies.
A social firewall builds on the observed preference
of home users to delegate security solutions to technol-
ogy, but also addresses the need for customized poli-
cies. However, there are critical design issues to ad-
dress before the potential benefits will be realized. In
the next section we describe several of these issues, and
our method for approaching them.
3 Incentive Centered Design
There are numerous challenges in designing a social fire-
wall, including interface and software engineering prob-
lems. However, the novel feature of our social fire-
wall is the harnessing of knowledge-sharing effort by hu-
mans, so we focus on behavioral issues critical to this ef-
fort. Knowledge-sharing depends on human behavioral
choices concerning participation, effort, quality-control,
and trustworthiness, among others.
3In addition, when people rely on aggregating past binary decisions,
the problem of information cascading can lead to disastrously bad out-
comes where everyone follows the crowd even when it is wrong; binary
predictions must be supplemented with outcome data or useful contex-
tual data to avoid this [3].
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In [18, 19] we argued that “humans are ‘smart com-
ponents’ in a system, but cannot be directly programmed
to perform; rather, their autonomy must be respected as
a design constraint and incentives provided to induce de-
sired behavior.” A social firewall is a system whose per-
formance depends unavoidably on human choices about
how to interact with the system, and how to interact with
other humans using the system. Therefore, we apply the
methods of incentive-centered design (ICD). In system
design we directly include humans as smart, distributed
and — crucially — autonomous components, with their
own information sets and motivations. We draw primar-
ily on microeconomics, game theory, social and cog-
nitive psychology to model motivations, individual re-
sponses to them, and inter-individual strategic awareness
and behavior.
We now discuss three fundamental behavioral issues
for the design of a social firewall system: “getting stuff
in” (contribution), “getting good stuff” (quality), and
“keeping bad stuff out” (manipulation).
3.1 Getting stuff in
Sharing knowledge among social firewall participants re-
quires that autonomous, self-motivated individuals vol-
untarily contribute their knowledge. Knowledge is non-
rivalrous: its use by one person does not materially re-
duce its value for use by another person. To use a fa-
miliar example, once National Public Radio broadcasts a
program over electromagnetic spectrum, consumption by
one listener does not crowd out consumption by another
listener. For information, nonrivalry is generally true be-
cause the incremental costs of (digital) reproduction and
distribution are approximately zero, and thus multiple in-
stances of the information can be “consumed” without
“using it up”. Nonrivalry is a defining characteristic of a
public good [2].
Thus, knowledge contribution to a social firewalling
system is a problem in the private provision of public
goods, which generally results in underprovision [13, 2].
(The social psychology literature refers to roughly the
same problem as “social loafing”.) Given the priority of
contribution (quality is of little consequence if an insuf-
ficient number are contributing), this is the problem on
which we focus in this paper.
Theorists propose several approaches to raise the level
of private contribution [7, for example]. Each faces
practical problems in any application, but in particular
the solution for social firewall knowledge-sharing is not
straightforward, for three reasons. First, barring exter-
nal incentives such as monetary payments, those who al-
ready have the knowledge may already enjoy most or all
of its benefits without incurring the cost of sharing.4 A
4The private benefit of having a database tool to store the history of
user already knows what she knows, and so adding her
knowledge to the database does not benefit her.
Second, botnet software has become rather sophisti-
cated. One common feature is that it watches the system
state, and waits to put a significant load on the system
until most resources are idle. Thus, the local user bears
little of the cost of having a zombie, since her processes
are not starved for resources. She may not even notice
her machine has been infected, and if she does, she may
not have much incentive to clean it. Thus, the botnet is a
classic externality problem: the costs are borne by others
(who suffer from spam, denial of service attacks, etc.),
not by the person who is “causing” the problem.
Third, nearly all proposed contribution mechanisms
are for contributions made in a numeraire — such as
money — that is homogeneous and additive, neither of
which are characteristics of information.5 Therefore,
we focus on mechanisms that rely on non-monetary but
extrinsic incentives to motivate knowledge-sharing. In
particular, we propose and analyze an excludable pub-
lic good mechanism, in which users are excluded from
obtaining the benefits of the social firewall unless they
make sufficient contributions of their own.6
3.2 Getting good stuff
As we mentioned earlier, different types of information
might be useful to users of the social firewall, such as
policy decisions, reasoning for those decisions, and in-
formation about similar users. However, rants, conspir-
acy theories, and random musings, common on many
discussion boards, are less useful. Usefulness also de-
pends on accuracy and clarity. The problem of getting
people to not only contribute quality as well as quan-
tity activates at least two problems: evaluation (what is
the quality of a contribution?), and a behavioral problem
known as hidden action (or moral hazard): how do we
induce participants to provide desirable quality when we
cannot observe or directly command their effort?
3.3 Keeping bad stuff out
Any security method needs to be resistant to manipula-
tion. For example the bot-herder will want to masquer-
one’s own decisions and reasons for them may be valuable enough to
motivate contributions; cf. our findings on private motivations to store
bookmarks in del.icio.us [20]. Since storing notes is not a dif-
ficult operation for unsophisticated users, we assume that this motiva-
tion is not enough to induce efficient contributions to the social firewall
database.
5Mechanism is a term of art referring to a set of rules about mes-
sages agents can pass to a mediator, and the mapping of messages to
actions taken by the mediator. An auction’s bidding and allocation rules
are a familiar example.
6Many will be familiar with a popular recent application of this ap-
proach: the tit-for-tat throttling mechanism in BitTorrent [4].
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ade as a trusted member in order to bias security recom-
mendations towards allowing its bots to infect machines.
Manipulation is an instance of a more general class of
hidden information problems that we refer to as pollu-
tion. A participant has personal goals that are unrelated
to the community’s goals, and in the course of pursuing
her goals, she causes harm to others.7 The underlying
problem is that the agent requesting the computer to take
actions knows her actions are undesirable, but the com-
puter’s owner does not: this private knowledge is the hid-
den information (“I am a hacker”). Keeping bad stuff out
is a common problem in social computing settings be-
cause contribution platforms tend to be open. Email, for
example, is a rather open system and spammers regularly
use it to distribute unsolicited bulk advertisements.
We have shown that many security techniques are in-
stances of a screening mechanism, which is an incentive-
centered design to sort good participants from bad [18,
19]. For example, passwords, CAPTCHAs and other
challenge-response systems are screens, and their suc-
cess depends on designing them so that the incentive
compatibility conditions are satisfied. There are other
types of incentive mechanism to consider when design-
ing for manipulation resistance.
4 Inducing Contribution
In this paper, we focus on the first major behavioral
problem for a social firewall: encouraging users to con-
tribute their information. We propose an excludable pub-
lic goods mechanism. If participants do not meet or ex-
ceed a threshold for contribution activity, they are denied
access to the information in the social firewall database.
While the proposal is simple, the associated behaviors
are not. For example, if the threshold is increased, some
users will contribute more, but others may stop partic-
ipating, so the net effect is not obvious. We formalize
this mechanism and analyze its use with a mathematical
model that makes explicit the strategic interplay between
the participants. Our modeling is intentionally stylized
to allow us to capture the main ideas yet obtain analytic
results.
4.1 Model
The fundamental novel feature of a social firewall is a
repository of information about policy decisions and par-
ticipant characteristics. When a user is asked to make a
policy decision, she is presented with this information
(or a useful summary). After making a decision she can
report her decision, and some information about it.
7This is another example of a negative externality, similar to the
problem of the home computer user who allows her machine to be col-
onized because she is not seriously harmed.
We assume there is a continuum of users indexed by
i ∈ [0, N ]. Each user i chooses an amount of information
to contribute, xi.8 Each user receives some value from
using this repository v(X), where X =
∫ N
0
xi di is the
total information in the repository.
Contributing is not costless, as it requires time and ef-
fort. We assume each user’s cost can be represented by a
standard cost function ci(x) which is increasing, convex
(∂ci∂x > 0,
∂2ci
∂x2 > 0), and has ci(0) = 0 for everyone. We
assume individual costs are ordered such that for all x, ei-
ther ci(x) > cj(x) or ci(x) < cj(x) if i 6= j. Without
loss of generality, we assume that users with low num-
bers have the highest cost functions: ci(x) > cj(x)∀x iff
i < j, or equivalently that ∂ci∂i < 0.
This is an excludable system: the designer sets a
threshold t of contributions such that if, and only if, users
contribute greater than t information, they are permitted
to use the repository. The total benefit (utility) a user re-
ceives from the repository if she contributes xi informa-
tion, when everyone else contributes x−i =
∫




v(X)− ci(xi) if xi ≥ t
−ci(xi) if xi < t
(1)
4.2 Underprovision
We are modeling a standard public good: the consump-
tion of X is nonrivalrous: everyone benefits from all of
the information, with no decrease in its value if the num-
ber of participating consumers increases. Therefore, we
can establish that with voluntary provision, the public
good will be underprovided: the equilibrium size of the
database will be smaller than the socially optimal size.
To find the benchmark social optimum, we imagine
that an omniscient social planner can assign contribution
levels to each participant to maximize unweighted ag-
gregate social welfare: {x+i , t+} = argmax{xi,t}U ≡∫
i
ui(xi, x−i). It is trivial to show the optimal threshold
is t+ = 0 (everyone consumes), since there is no social
cost from consuming once the repository is created.
To find the voluntary non-exclusionary equilibrium,
again set t = 0, but now let each individual choose
her own contribution, x0i , to maximize her own utility
function. She contributes only to the point at which her
marginal benefit equals her marginal contribution cost.
In contrast, in the social optimum each individual con-
tributes as long as the sum of everyone’s marginal ben-
efit equals the individual’s marginal cost, which yields
8To implement, we need a metric for information quantity. As long
is there is some reasonable measure that is correlated with an improve-
ment in policy decisions, our qualitative results go through. For exam-
ple, x might be the number of policy decisions about which the user
reports.
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(weakly) more provision from each individual.
Proposition 1 The optimal size of the database X+ =∫
i
x+i di created by a social planner is larger than the
size of the database X0 =
∫
i
x0i di that would be volun-
tarily provided: X+ > X0.
Proof: Mathematical proofs are provided in the Ap-
pendix.
4.3 An Exclusion Equilibrium
With voluntary contributions and no exclusion from use,
the repository will be smaller than ideal. If we set a min-
imum contribution level, can we increase social welfare
by inducing a larger repository? The answer is not obvi-
ous, because some users will forgo the repository rather
than contribute more.
Suppose that a user expects the total contribution
of other users to be fixed at x̄−i, regardless of her
contribution level. For expository purposes, define
f(xi, x̄−i) = v(
∫
j
xj dj) − ci(xi) to be the total util-
ity to user i from using the repository Then we can de-
fine conjectural unconstrained contribution levels, x̂i =
argmaxxif(xi, x̄−i). Now we can obtain a user’s best
response (to x̄−i) contribution:
Lemma 1 User i’s optimal contribution x∗i will be:
x∗i =

x̂i if x̂i ≥ t
t if x̂i < t and v(
∫
j
xj dj)− ci(t) ≥ 0
0 if x̂i < t and v(
∫
j
xj dj)− ci(t) < 0
If the user wants to contribute more than the threshold,
she can and will do so. Otherwise, she chooses between
contributing the minimum to gain access, and contribut-
ing nothing (and receiving nothing). If her total util-
ity from contributing enough to get repository access is
greater than from not participating (which we earlier nor-
malized to 0), she contributes the minimum, even though
the marginal cost of contributing t is higher than the
marginal benefit, and she would prefer to contribute less.
Now we characterize a Nash equilibrium: with users
ordered by costs, there is a natural partition into three
groups, corresponding to the possible contribution levels.
Lemma 2 For any threshold level t there exists a Nash
equilibrium of contributions characterized by an i0 and
an i∗ such that
x∗i = 0 if i ≤ i0
x∗i = t if i
0 < i < i∗
x∗i = x̂i if i > i
∗
4.4 Optimal Exclusion Rule
In Lemmas 1 and 2 we characterize behavior given a
specified exclusion level, t. Is using such an exclusion
rule worthwhile? That is, is there an exclusion level
t > 0 such that social welfare (the sum of everybody’s
utility) is higher than at t = 0 (as it is under non-
exclusionary voluntary provision)?
Proposition 2 If there is at least one free-rider who, un-
der voluntary provision, strictly prefers to receive access
to the repository, yet contributes nothing, then there ex-
ists a t > 0 that increases social welfare relative to
t = 0.
Now we know that an excludable public goods mech-
anism can outperform non-exclusionary voluntary provi-
sion. We next characterize the optimal threshold :
Proposition 3 At the socially optimal t∗ the sum of
marginal gains to everyone who retains access are equal
to the sum of marginal costs incurred by all of those who
contribute just the threshold amount, t∗.
Even though it is costless to let everyone access the
repository and benefit from its security policy recom-
mendations, we are better off to use an excludable public
goods rule that imposes a minimum contribution. The
reason is simple: without the incentive (“pay to play”),
participants will undercontribute, and fully or partially
free-ride on the contributions of others. The social fire-
wall will be more socially valuable if it is at least po-
tentially exclusive. We can provide guidance on setting
the exclusion level: set aggregate marginal benefits equal
to aggregate marginal cost. That is, at the optimal t∗,
a small increase in t would cause the cost increase to
those people who contribution the minimum to be equal
to the increase in benefits to everyone who still receives
benefits. The critical issue is that marginal benefits are
only experienced by those wiling to contribute at least
the minimum, and finding the optimal threshold in prac-
tice requires balancing the incremental gains from higher
contribution levels against the loss of contributions from
those who decline to participate at higher threshold lev-
els.
5 Discussion
A social firewall can improve home computer security.
It leverages two facts: home users prefer to delegate
some security decision making, and home firewall poli-
cies should be customized. However, a working social
firewall requires the solution of several design problems.
We focus on a subset of these problems: those that arise
because users are autonomous and motivated humans.
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We identify problems of contribution, quality, and ma-
nipulation.
In this paper we particularly focus on the first, and fun-
damental problem: how to design a social firewall so that
people will contribute. We proposed an excludable pub-
lic goods mechanism that requires no monetary transac-
tions. We showed that when available content is suffi-
ciently valuable, some participants contribute at least a
threshold amount rather than free-ride. Further, the opti-
mal exclusion threshold is greater than zero, and we char-
acterized the trade-off that determines how it should be
set.
For quality, we are developing a method that draws
on social psychology and computer science. The first
component is a reputation system to provide both qual-
ity evaluation and a social comparison benchmark [6]. A
long literature characterizes ways in which upward (e.g.,
“leader board”) and downward comparisons can be struc-
tured to motivate attention to quality (see, for a recent
example, [8]). Second, we can reduce the burden on the
user to provide textual data to support personalization by
mining system usage data. For example, given a user’s
history of allow/deny decisions, the server could gener-
ate recommendations based on the behavior of a cluster
of similar others (see, e.g., [11]).
For manipulation, we could pursue a screening mech-
anism such as we described in [18, 19]. However, we
think a more promising approach for a social firewall
may be an influence limiter [12]. This is an algorithm
that is provably resistant to a broad class of attack strate-
gies. In particular, an influence limiter resists Sybil at-
tacks by limiting how much influence each Sybil has on
the recommendation.
When we finish developing these components, we will
have a social firewall that can be layered on an existing
interactive firewall. It will address the core behavioral
problems (motivations to contribute both quantity and
quality, and to discourage manipulation) through a com-
bination of incentive-centered designs (excludable public
goods mechanism; reputation system; collaborative fil-
tering; and an influence limiter). We plan to test a proto-
type in our human-subjects experiment lab, and a refined
version in the field. We do not claim that a social firewall
will eliminate the botnet problem by itself, but by match-
ing the design to the pivotal human behavior problems,
we hope to contribute a valuable part of the solution.
References
[1] BARFORD, P., AND YEGNESWARAN, V. An inside look at bot-
nets. In Special Workshop on Malware Detection, (2006), Ad-
vances in Information Security, Springer-Verlag.
[2] BERGSTROM, T., BLUME, L. E., AND VARIAN, H. On the
private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics
29, 1 (January 1986), 25–49.
[3] BIKHCHANDANI, S., HIRSHLEIFER, D., AND WELCH, I. A the-
ory of fads, fashion, and cultural change as information cascades.
Journal of Political Economy 100, 5 (October 1992), 992–1026.
[4] COHEN, B. Incentives build robustness in bittorrent. In Workshop
on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (June 2003).
[5] DOURISH, P., GRINTER, R., DE LA FLOR, J. D., AND JOSEPH,
M. Security in the wild: User strategies for managing security as
an everyday, practical problem. Personal and Ubiquitous Com-
puting 8, 6 (November 2004), 391–401.
[6] FESTINGER, L. A theory of social comparison. Human Relations
(1954).
[7] GROVES, T., AND LEDYARD, J. Optimal allocation of public
goods: A solution to the ”free rider” problem. Econometrica 45,
4 (May 1977), 783–809.
[8] LING, K., BEENEN, G., LUDFORD, P., WANG, X., CHANG,
K., COSLEY, D., FRANKOWSKI, D., TERVEEN, L., RASHID,
A. M., RESNICK, P., AND KRAUT, R. Using social psychol-
ogy to motivate contributions to online communities. Journal of
Computer-Mediated Communication 10, 4 (2005).
[9] MILGROM, P., AND SHANNON, C. Monotone comparative stat-
ics. Econometrica 62, 1 (January 1994), 157–180.
[10] RATLIFF, E. The zombie hunters. The New Yorker (October 10
2006).
[11] RESNICK, P., IACOVOU, N., SUSHAK, M., BERGSTROM, P.,
AND REIDL, J. Grouplens: An open architecture for collabora-
tive filtering. In Proceedings of the 1994 ACM Conference on
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (1994), pp. 175–186.
[12] RESNICK, P., AND SAMI, R. The influence-limiter: Provably
manipulation-resistant recommender systems. In Recommender
Systems (Minneapolis, MN, October 2007), ACM.
[13] SAMUELSON, P. A. The pure theory of public expenditure. Re-
view of Economics and Statistics 36, 4 (November 1954), 387–
389.
[14] SCARFONE, K., AND MELL, P. Guide to intrusion detection
and prevention systems (idps). Tech. Rep. SP 800-94, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, February 2007.
[15] SIEBERG, D. Experts: Botnets no. 1 emerging internet threat.
CNN.com, Technology Section (January 2006).
[16] STONE, B. Spam doubles, finding new ways to deliver itself.
New York Times (December 2006).
[17] TREND MICRO. Taxonomy of botnet threats. Whitepaper,
November 2006.
[18] WASH, R., AND MACKIE-MASON, J. K. Incentive-centered de-
sign for information security. In USENIX Hot Topics in Security
(HotSec 06) (Vancouver, BC, 2006), USENIX.
[19] WASH, R., AND MACKIE-MASON, J. K. Security when people
matter: Structuring incentives for user behavior. In Ninth Inter-
national Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC-07) (New
York, NY, USA, 2007), ACM, pp. 7–14.
[20] WASH, R., AND RADER, E. Public bookmarks and private ben-
efits: An analysis of incentives in social computing. In American
Society for Information Science & Technology (October 2007).
[21] ZHUGE, J., HOLZ, T., HAN, X., GUO, J., AND ZOU, W. Chara-
terizing the irc-based botnet phenomenon. Tech. Rep. TR-2007-
010, The Honeynet Project, 2007.
6
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: A social planner would choose the levels of con-














xj dj)− ci(xi) di
]
Let us define {x+i } to be the set of xi that maximizes this
equation. Then we can define X+ =
∫
i
x+i di. The solu-
tion to this would satisfy the first order conditions (FOC)
that the first derivative of this function with respect to
each choice variable is equal to 0. There are an infinite
number of choice variables, so there are an infinite num-
ber of first order conditions, one for each person i. The
first order conditions are all of the form:∫
j
v′(X+) dj − c′i(x+i ) ≤ 0 (2)
(with equality if x+i > 0)
where the notation v′(X) means the first derivative of v
with respect to its argument, evaluated at X . Each xi
will be chosen such that the marginal cost to person i is
equal to the marginal benefit to society, which is the sum
(integral) of the marginal benefits to each person.
In contrast, in the voluntary provision equilibrium,










Define x0i to be the xi that maximizes this expression.
Then we can define X0 =
∫
i
x0i di. Each x
0
i that is cho-
sen will satisfy its first order condition:
v′(X0)− c′i(x0i ) ≤ 0 (3)
(with equality if x0i > 0)
Under voluntary provision, each person i will keep in-
creasing their contribution xi until their marginal cost of
contribution is equal to their own personal marginal ben-
efit.
Remember that by definition, v′′(·) < 0 (v is concave)
and c′′i (·) > 0 (c is convex). This means that the marginal
value v′(·) is decreasing in xi and the marginal cost c′i(·)
is increasing in xi. Comparing equations 2 and 3, we can
see that the marginal cost will be lower in the voluntary
provision equilibrium than the social optimal. Since c
is concave, the only way this can happen is when xi is
smaller. Since this is true for all i, the total X0 must be
smaller than X+. Q.E.D.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: First note that in the definition of individual i’s
utility (Eq 1), for any given xi the first line is always
greater than the second line since v(·) > 0 by assump-
tion. As such, if the unconstrained maximum x̂i > t then
it is also the maximum of ui(·). Therefore, if x̂i > t then
the user’s optimal choice is to choose x̂i.
Next, notice that f(x, x̄−i) is concave in x every-
where by assumption (v(·) is concave, and −ci()̇ is con-
cave since ci(·) is convex). Therefore, for any x > x̂i,
f(x, x̄−i) is non-increasing in x. So, if x̂i < t then the
contribution xi that is sufficient to access the repository
and maximizes utility is xi = t. Also, notice that the
second line (where the user does not receive access to
the repository) is also non-increasing in x. The utility
from this option is maximized when contributing nothing
(xi = 0). So, if the user’s ideal contribution x̂i < t then
they have to choose between contributing the minimum
to receive access (xi = t) or not contributing anything
(xi = 0). It is straightforward to see that the user will
choose to receive access whenever the benefit v(X) with
xi = t is greater than the increase in cost ci(t). Q.E.D.
C Proof of Lemma 2
First, we must step aside, repeat a famous result from
Milgrom and Shannon, and prove a simple fact about our
utility function.
Milgrom and Shannon [9] define a function f(x, i) to
have increasing differences (ID) if for all x′ > x′′, i′ >
i′′, f(x′, i′)−f(x′′, i′) > f(x′, i′′)−f(x′′, i′′). Another
way of saying this is that for x > y, f(x, i) − f(y, i) is
increasing in i. For continuous and differentiable func-
tions, this is similar and related to the property that the
cross derivative is positive. Milgrom and Shannon [9]
were then able to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994 [9]) If
f(x, i) is supermodular in x, and f(x, i) has increas-
ing differences in (x, i) then x̂ = argmaxxf(x, i) is
non-decreasing in i.
Now, let us define the two functions. First, let us define









x̄j if j 6= i
xi if j = i
Now we can define a function that specifies the total util-
ity of person i contributing amount x:
g(x, i) = v(X(x, x̄−i))− ci(xi)
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In order to use the theorem from Milgrom and Shan-
non, we must first show when g(x, i) has increasing dif-
ferences:
Lemma 3 If users expect that x̄−j ≥ x̄−i for all i > j,
then g(x, i) as increasing differences in (x, i).
Proof: Let x′ > x′′, and i > j. We need to show that
g(x′, i)− g(x′′, i) > g(x′, j)− g(x′′, j).
g(x′, i)− g(x′′, i)
= v(X(x′, x̄−i))− v(X(x′′, x̄−i))− (ci(x′)− ci(x′′))
≥ v(X(x′, x̄−i))− v(X(x′′, x̄−i))− (cj(x′)− cj(x′′))
≥ v(X(x′, x̄−j))− v(X(x′′, x̄−j))− (cj(x′)− cj(x′′))
= f(x′, j)− f(x′′, j)
The first equality is by definition. The first inequality
comes from the definition of ci: We know that ci(x′) >
ci(x′′) since ci(·) is increasing. We also know that
cj(x′) < ci(x′) by definition. We make an addition tech-
nical assumption that −ci(x) has increasing differences
in (x, i). The second inequality results from the fact that
v(·) is convex. If the users expect that x̄−j ≥ x̄−i then
X(x, x̄−j) ≥ X(x, x̄−i) since ∂X∂x̄−i > 0. v(·) is increas-
ing and concave, so the second inequality holds. Q.E.D.
A simple correlary of the Milgrom and Roberts theo-
rem and Lemma 3 follows:
Corollary 1 If users expect x̄−j > x̄−i for i > j, then
x̂i is non-decreasing in i.
We use this corollary to finally prove Lemma 2. As a
reminder, the lemma states that there exists a i0 and a i∗
such that the following is a Nash equilibrium:
x∗i = 0 if i ≤ i0 (4)
x∗i = t if i
0 < i < i∗ (5)
x∗i = x̂i if i > i
∗ (6)
Proof: Here we prove that contributions characterized
by lines 4-6 constitute a fulfilled expectations Nash equi-
librium, in that if the users expect everyone else to make
contributions according to this schedule, then they do not
want to deviate. First note that this schedule of contribu-
tions is non-decreasing in i: no user i contributes less
than any user numbered less than i. If users expect each
other to contribute according to this schedule of contri-
butions, then the precondition for Lemma 3 is fulfilled.
Let us begin with line 6. Assume that for some i,
x∗i = x̂i, meaning that user i chose to contribute his op-
timal amount, which is greater than the threshold t by
Lemma 1. Then all users j > i will also want to con-
tribute their optimal amount x̂j , since by Corollary 1,
x̂j > x̂i and the user’s optimal choice according to
Lemma 1 is to contribute x̂j . Define i∗ to be the smallest
i that contributes x̂i.
Next we move to line 4. Assume that for some j,
x∗j = 0. By Lemma 1, we know that x̂j < t and
v(X(t, x−j)) < cj(t). This last statement is equiva-
lent to saying g(t, j) < 0. Then all users i < j will
also want to contribute 0. We know that x̂i ≤ x̂j by
Corollary 1, so x̂i < t. ci(t) > cj(t) by assump-
tion on c(·). By Lemma 3, we know that g(x, i) has
increasing differences. This means that in particular,
g(t, i) − g(0, i) < g(t, j) − g(0, j). Since we are look-
ing at a Nash equilibrium here, person i chooses expect-
ing person j to contribute nothing, and person j chooses
expecting person i to contribute nothing. Therefore,
x−i = x−j , ci(0) = cj(0) = 0 (by assumption) and
g(0, i)
= v(X(0, x−i))− ci(0) = v(X(0, x−j))− cj(0)
= g(0, j)
By Lemma 3, g(t, i) < g(t, j) < 0. Therefore, person i
would also choose to contribute x∗i = 0. Define i
0 to be
the maximum i such that x∗i = 0.
Line 5 is all that is left, and is fairly straightforward
now. Choose an i such that i0 < i < i∗. We know that
x̂i < t since i < i∗. We know that g(t, i) > 0 since
i > i0. Therefore, by Lemma 1, person i will choose to
contribute t.
Finally, we note that in this equilibrium, x∗i < x
∗
j for
all i < j. This means that in equilibrium, the precondi-
tion for Lemma 3 holds. Q.E.D.
D Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Both Propositions 2 and 3 depend on the first derivative
of the social welfware with respect to t. As such, we first
prove a lemma about this derivative, and then use this



















Proof: To prove this, we first note that Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 together imply that:
v(X(t, x∗−i∗))− ci∗(t) = v(X(x∗i∗ , x∗−i∗))− ci∗(x∗i∗)
(7)
v(X(t, x∗−i0))− ci0(t) = 0 (8)
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Now, first we split up the initial integral to its four sep-























Applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus































































The first two lines can be eliminated by equations 7
and 8, leaving the intended conclusion. Eliminating
these two lines is equivalent to saying that as t changes,
changes in i∗ don’t matter because person i∗ wants to
voluntarily contribute exactly t, and changes in i0 don’t
matter because person i0 doesn’t receive any net value
from access (and contributing t). Q.E.D.
We need one more simple lemma before we can prove
the propositions:
Lemma 5 As t increases, everyone who is voluntarily
contributing greater than t will alter their contribution
in exactly the opposite direction as the overall change in
database size.
Proof: The FOC for x̂i states that
v′(X)− c′(xi) = 0






This derivative is always negative (by the concavity and
convexity assumptions on v(·) and c(·)), and furthermore
has the same sign for all i ≥ i∗. Therefore, as X (and,
consequently, x−i) increases, the voluntary contributors
decrease their contribution slightly, but not enough to
change the overall direction of change in X . Q.E.D.
Now that we have proved these lemmas, it is easy to
derive the two propositions. For proposition 2, we as-
sume that there is at least one free rider. What his means
is that in the voluntary provision equilibrium, at least one
person (person number 0) has v(X0) < c′i(0), or his
marginal benefit of contributing anything is below his
marginal cost. It must also be true that v(X0) > 0,
meaning he receives positive value from accessing the
database. He would not voluntarily contribute anything,
and would free-ride on the contributions of others.
For this person, if we increase t from 0 to some small
amount t0 > 0, he will have to pay a cost c0(t0) if he
still wants access to the database. But, since the value
of the database is strictly positive and everything is con-
tinuous, there must exist a small enough t0 such that
v(X(t0, X0)) > c0(t0). This will cause the total size
of the database to increase. Everyone else will decrease
their contribution, but the total decrease from everyone
else will be less than t0 (by Lemma 5), so the total size of
the database will increase. By Lemma 4, this must result
in a positive increase in welfare. Thus, there is a positive
t that leads to a welfare improvement from the voluntary
contribution equilibrium, proving Proposition 2.
The socially optimal t∗ will maximize social welfare.
The first order condition of this maximization sets the
derivative of social welfare with respect to t (the deriva-



















































The first order conditions say that the optimal t∗ is the
one that makes this expression equal to 0. This is the
statement of the conclusion of Proposition 3.
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